

Windows Threat Hunting

UBNetDef, Fall 2023 Week 6

Presenter:

Anthony Magrene & Griffin Refol

Microsoft HIJ VINCLOVS




Agenda – Week 6

- Incident Response (IR) High Level
- Windows Concepts
- Network Forensics
- PowerShell for IR.
- Hands-on Activity 1-2
- Windows Management Instrumentation (WIVII) & Services
- Hands-on Activity 3
- Persistence
- Hands-on Activity 4





Incident Response





Windows Concepts



Notable File Types



Dynamic Link Library (.dll)


- Windows implementation of shared libraries
- Prevents redundant storage commonly used code


Name	Date modified	Type	Size
aadauthhelper,dll	12/11/2020 6:13 PM	Application exten	449 KB
aadcloudap.dll	12/11/2020 6:13 PM	Application exten	970 KB
aadjcsp.dll	3/12/2021 10:15 PM	Application exten	101 KB
aadtb.dll	1/12/2021 1:43 PM	Application exten	1,383 KB
aadWamExtension.dll	1/12/2021 1:43 PM	Application exten	150 KB
AarSvc.dll	3/12/2021 10:15 PM	Application exten	434 KB
AboutSettingsHandlers.dll	1/12/2021 1:43 PM	Application exten	431 KB
AboveLockAppHost.dll	3/12/2021 10:15 PM	Application exten	410 KB
accessibilitycpl.dll	2/11/2021 3:15 PM	Application exten	275 KB
accountaccessor.dll	1/12/2021 1:44 PM	Application exten	268 KB
AccountsRt.dll	1/12/2021 1:44 PM	Application exten	426 KB
AcGenral.dll	10/23/2020 3:20 PM	Application exten	362 KB
AcLayers.dll	12/11/2020 6:14 PM	Application exten	319 KB
acledit.dll	12/7/2019 4:09 AM	Application exten	11 KB
aclui.dll	12/7/2019 4:09 AM	Application exten	574 KB
acmigration.dll	3/12/2021 10:15 PM	Application exten	381 KB
ACPBackgroundManagerPolicy.dll	1/12/2021 1:43 PM	Application exten	191 KB
acppage.dll	1/12/2021 1:43 PM	Application exten	87 KE
acproxy.dll	12/7/2019 4:09 AM	Application exten	13 KB



Portable Executable (.exe)

- Machine code that is executed by the operating system
- May be written using high-level languages
 - GO, C++, C, Ruby etc.







PowerShell Script (.ps1)


- PowerShell Integrated Scripting Environment (ISE)
- Extensive .NET integration

```
Windows PowerShell ISE
          [sigint] | 101
[sigint] | 103
         [BigInt] Shelp*Sq
[BigInt] Sfin*(Sp-1)*(Sq-1)
          [BigInt] | Septh=[math]::Sept(Sh)
| BigInt] | Septh=[math]::Sept(SPin)
         *build list of 1 < e < fi(N) List is Sexules
         while(Siton -eq Sfalse)(
               while(SI -lt SFIN)(
          #factors of N and factors of fi(N)
         $1-1
toron Walse
         while(Satop -eq. Sfalse)
              while(51 -le Sagris)(
if((50 % 51) -eq 0){
                          SMFactors += $1
SMFactors += $A/$1
              while($1 -le Sourctio)(
                    if((SFin % Si) -eq 0)[
```



Event Log (.evtx)

- Stores Windows Logs
- Located C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\
- Event viewer used to view logs





The Registry



Registry

- Hierarchical database
 - Stores low-level settings


Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE Computer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT HKEY_CURRENT_USER HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE HKEY_USERS HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG



```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
         CentralProcessor
          FloatingPointProcessor
          MultifunctionAdapter
          VideoAdapterBusses
```




Registry cont.





Registry cont.






Task Manager



Task Manager


Provides high-level view of what is running


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




How to open it?









Can be used to find the location a running executable.


>	MSBuild (32 hit)				5.8 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		
	MSBι	Collapse								
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>	Runtim	Create dump file		0%	1.1 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		
>	Setting Setting	Go to details	φ	0%	0 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		
>	🖶 Spoole	Open file location		0%	3.3 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		
>	■ Start	Search online		0%	11.9 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		
>	System.	Properties		0%	2.6 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low		




Show the properties of an executable

>	Microsoft Network Realtime Ins	0%	2.8 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
	Microsoft OneDrive	0%	13.5 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
>	Microsoft Software Protection P	0%	5.2 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
	A Microsoft Windows Search Filte	0%	1.1 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	
>	Microsoft Windows Search Inde	0%	5.2 MB	0.1 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
	Microsoft Windows Search Prot	0%	1.2 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
>	MSBuild (32 bit) Collapse MSBuild End task	0%	6.0 MB	0 MB/s	0 Mbps	Very low	Very low
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


Event Viewer



Event Viewer

Log viewer for Windows








Event Viewer

Can be opened by searching for "event" and clicking open





Logs are stored in a hierarchical structure




- > Gustom Views
- > iii Windows Logs
- Applications and Services Logs
 - 🔚 Subscriptions






Windows activities are stored within the "Windows Logs" folder





- Windows Logs are divided into 5 categories
 - Application
 - Logs related to some applications installed on system
 - Security
 - Security related logs (authentication actions are found here)
 - Setup
 - Installation of software on system (e.g., update installs are logged)
 - System
 - Low-level system events
 - Forwarded events
 - Events forwarded to local machine by remote machines





Individual logs are listed in the middle pane



```
Date and Time
                                                    Event ID Task Category
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5/48:27 ... Microsoft Wi.,
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5/48/27 ... Microsoft Wi.
                                                       5379 User Account Management
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5/48/27 ... Microsoft Wi.
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5:48:27 ... Microsoft Wi.,
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S. 3/1/2022 548:27 _ Microsoft Wi ..
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5:48:27 _ Microsoft Wi _
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit 5. 3/1/2022 5/48:27 _ Microsoft Wi.
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5/48:27 ... Microsoft Wi.,
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 548:27 ... Microsoft Wi ...
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S., 3/1/2022 5/48/27 ., Microsoft Wi.,
                                                       5379 User Account Management
Audit S. 3/1/2022 5/4827 _ Microsoft Wi_
                                                       5379 User Account Management
```

Event 5379, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

Credential Manager credentials were read.

Read Operation:

Subject

Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412(anthony Account Name: anthony Account Domain: LAPTOP-2LN9C412 Logon ID: 0x60A7188

This event occurs when a user performs a read operation on stored credentials in Credential Manager.

Enumerate Credentials

 Log Name:
 Security

 Source:
 Microsoft Windows security:
 Logged:
 3/1/2022 548:27 PM

 Event ID:
 5379
 Task Category:
 User Account Management

 Level:
 Information
 Keywords:
 Audit Success

 User:
 N/A
 Computer:
 LAPTOP-2LN9C412

 OpCode:
 Info

 More Information:
 Event Log Online Help



- Individual logs vary in complexity
- Windows generates many logs
 - Many of these logs are not helpful

An account was successfully logged on.

Subject:

Security ID: SYSTEM

Account Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\$
Account Domain: WORKGROUP

Logon ID: 0x3E7

Logon Information:

Logon Type: 2
Restricted Admin Mode: Virtual Account: No
Elevated Token: Yes

Impersonation Level: Impersonation

New Logon:

Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthony

Account Name: anthony

Account Domain: LAPTOP-2LN9C412
Logon ID: 0x40A47CA
Linked Logon ID: 0x40A47FD

Network Account Name: -Network Account Domain: -

Process Information:

Process ID: 0x88c

Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

Network Information:

Log Name: Security

Source: Microsoft Windows security: Logged: 2/28/2022 4:53:53 PM

Event ID: 4624 Task Category: Logon

 Level:
 Information
 Keywords:
 Audit Success

 User:
 N/A
 Computer:
 LAPTOP-2LN9C412

OpCode: Info

More Information: Event Log Online Help



- Event IDs
 - Identifier numbers Microsoft assigns to types of events.
- Resource for Security Event IDs
 - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/default.aspx









4624: An account was successfully logged on

On this page

- · Description of this event
- · Field level details
- · Examples
- · Discuss this event.
- · Mini-seminars on this event

This is a highly valuable event since it documents each and every successful attempt to logon to the local computer regardless of logon type, location of the user or type of account. You can tie this event to logoff events 4634 and 4647 using Logon ID.

Win2012 adds the Impersonation Level field as shown in the example.

Win2016/10 add further fields explained below.




Discussions on Event ID 4624

- Where does descriptive text come from at the end of 4624?
- 4624 Type 3 Filtering Help

and the same	Number of events: 32,737 (New events available							
7 Filtere	d: Log: Security; Source ; E	vent ID: 4624. Number of ever	nts: 1,663	1					
Keywords	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category					
Audit S.	3/1/2022 6:13:59 PM	Microsoft WI	4624	Logon					
Audit S.	3/1/2022 6:03:24 PM	Microsoft Wi	4624	Logon					
Audit S.	3/1/2022 603:22 PM	Microsoft Wi.,	4624	Logon					
_	3/1/2022 5:48:26 PM	Microsoft Wi	4624	Logon					
_	3/1/2022 5/47/27 PM	Microsoft WL.	4624	Logon					
	3/1/2022 5:37:42 PM	Microsoft WL.	4624	Logon					
	3/1/2022 5:36:37 PM	Microsoft Wi	4624	Logon					
_	3/1/2022 5:36:34 PM	Microsoft Wi.,	4624	Logon					
_	3/1/2022 5:35:36 PM	Microsoft Wi	4624	Logon					
Audit S.	3/1/2022 5:34:15 PM	Microsoft Wi	4624	Logon					
event 4624	Microsoft Windows securit	ty auditing.							
General	Details								
An acco	unt was successfully logge	ed on.							
Subject									
	Security ID:	SYSTEM							
	Account Name	LAPTOP-2LN9C412S							
	Account Domain: Logon ID:	WORKGROUP 0x3E7							
190000		2001							
Logon k	nformation: Logon Type:	5							
	Restricted Admin Mode:								
	Virtual Account:	No							
	Elevated Token:	Yes							
Imperso	nation Level:	Impersonation							
New Loc	2000								
100	Security ID:	SYSTEM							
	Account Name:	SYSTEM							
	Account Domain: Logon ID:	NT AUTHORITY 0x3E7	NT AUTHORITY						
	Linked Logon ID:	0/0							
	Network Account Name:								
	Network Account Domail								
	Logon GUID:	(00000000-0000-0000-0000-		w)					
Process	Information:	0.000							
	Process ID: Process Name:	0x470 C:\WindowsSystem32serv	ices eve						
Network	Information:								
Log Nam									
Source		lows security . Logged:	3/1/2022 6	LIDED FRA					
Event ID:	-			LIALUS PINE					
	1000	Task Category:							
Level	Information	Keywords	Audit Suo						
Usen	N/A	Computer	LAPTOP-2	IN9C412					
OpCode									
	ormation: Event Log Onli								



- Event viewer sucks when trying to search logs in bulk.
- We can extract logs to a CSV file






- Excel can interpret these logs and be used to search them.
 - The CSV must be imported properly




Importing Logs in Excel






Importing Logs in Excel





Importing Logs in Excel






Logs in Excel

at A	B	C	D		
Keywords	- Date and Time -	Source	Event ID	Task Category	Column1
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:21	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4798	User Account Management	A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthony.
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:21	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4798	User Account Management	A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthony.
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:20	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4798	User Account Management	A user's local group membership was enumerated. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthony.
Audit Succes	3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
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Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	14 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	14 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-21N9C412\u00edanthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	15 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	15 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read.Subject:Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID: LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
6 Audit Succes	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes		Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing		User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
Audit Succes	ss 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount
 Audit Succes 	s 3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	5379	User Account Management	Credential Manager credentials were read. Subject: Security ID:LAPTOP-2LN9C412\anthonyAccount



Logs in Excel

Within Excel we can search logs using filters.





Logs in Excel

124	A	8	C	D E	E.	
	Keywords - I	Date and Time .	Source	Event ID J Task Category	Column1	
81	Audit Success	3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
	Audit Success	3/1/2022 18:16	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
	Audit Success	3/1/2022 18:13	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
	Audit Success	3/1/2022 18:03	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
89	Audit Success	3/1/2022 18:03	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on.Subject:Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name:LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
185	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:48	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
187	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:47	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
206	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:37	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
322	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:36	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
494	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:36	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
891	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:35	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
903	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:34	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
904	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:34	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1476	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:33	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1494	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:33	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1500	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:33	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1502	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:33	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1503	Audit Success	3/1/2022 17:33	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1510	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name; LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1512	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1516	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1524	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1528	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1529	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on: Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1531	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:41	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on.Subject:Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name:LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1537	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:40	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	1
1607	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:40	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	_
1609	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:39	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1611	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:39	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1614	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:22	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1616	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:08	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	
1618	Audit Success	2/28/2022 22:08	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	4624 Logon	An account was successfully logged on Subject: Security ID:SYSTEMAccount Name: LAPTOP-2LN9C41	



Homework Hint

- The initial vector of breach is in the Windows logs.
- The attack was a brute force attack against one of the Windows remote access tools.



Questions?



Network Forensics




Network Forensics Hands-on

- Sign onto the machine in your team folder called "WINIRForClass"
 - Username: sysadmin
 - Password: Change.me!



Wireshark

- Packet analyzer
- Free
- Open-source
- Available on:
 - Windows
 - Linux
 - MacOS





In Class Activity

WireShark




Hands on 0 - Wireshark

- Locate suspicious network traffic
- Create a Windows firewall rule to block the traffic



Network Forensics Hands-on











PowerShell For IR



PowerShell

- Automation and configuration tool
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/

Windows PowerShell Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Users\anthony>



Cmdlets

- Cmdlets are commands in PowerShell
- Cmdlets use verb-noun format
 - Get-computerinfo
 - Get-filehash
 - o Write-output
 - o Etc...





Get-Filehash

"Computes the hash value for a file by using a specified hash algorithm."



In Class Activity

PowerShell



Hands on 1 – Piping Output

- Compute the SHA384 hash of test.exe on your desktop using get-filehash
- Get-Filehash documentation
 - https://tinyurl.com/yw9zv3cw



Hands on 1 – Piping Output

Any problems with the result?



Hands on 1 – Piping Output

- We can send output from one command to another
- Output of command 1 is sent to command 2
 - o Ex: <command_1> | <command_2>
- Using the documentation below what command can we pipe to for the fix the output?
 - https://tinyurl.com/yw9zv3cw



Searching PowerShell Output

Get-Service "Gets the services on the computer."

Status	Name	DisplayName
Stopped		Agent Activation Nuntime 4dd2c3d
Runnling		Adobe Acrobat Update Service
	ASSService	Intel® SGX AESR
	Alfouter	AllJoyn Router Service
Stopped		Application Layer Gateway Service
	AppTDSvc	Application Identity
	Applioset	Application Information
	AppMent	Application Management
		App Readiness
Stopped		
	AppVCLLent	Microsoft App-V Client
RunnEng		AppX Deployment Service (AppXSVC)
	AssignedAccessM	AssignedAccessNanager Service
	AudioEndpointBu	Windows Audio Endpoint Builder
	Audiosry	Windows Audio
	autotimesus	Cellular Time
	AxInstSV	ActiveX Installer (AxInstSV)
		GameOVE and Broadcast User Service
	BOESVC	Bitlocker Drive Encryption Service
	BEService	BattlEye Service
Hunning		Base Filtering Engine
Stopped		Background Intelligent Transfer Ser
	BluetoothUserSe	
		Background Tasks Infrastructure Ser
	BTAGService	Bloetooth Audio Gatesay Service
Running	BthAvctaSvc	AVCIP service
	Milsery	Bluetooth Support Service
Running	CARSVE	Capability Access Mahager Service
		CaptureService_Additcld
Aunning	chdhavc 4460c3d	Clipboard User Service 4dd2c3d
Runnling		Connected Devices Platform Service
		Connected Devices Platform User Ser
Stopped		Certificate Propagation
	ClickToffunSvc	Microsoft Office Click-to-Mun Service
Runnling		Client License Service (ClipSVC)
Stopped		COM- System Application
Stopped		
Runnling		
Runnling		Intel(R) Content Protection HECI Se
Aunn Eng		Intel(R) Content Protection HDCP Se
Stopped		CredentialEnrollmentManagerUserSvc
Runnling		Cryptographic Services
	CscService	Offline Files
Burning		DCOM Server Process Launcher



- Run get-service
- Run get-service | select *
- What is the difference of the output?



PS C:\Users\anthony> get-service

```
DisplayName
Status
Running AarSvc 197f19e7
                           Agent Activation Runtime 197f19e7
Running AdobeARMservice
                           Adobe Acrobat Update Service
Running AESMService
                           Intel® SGX AESM
Stopped AJRouter
                           AllJoyn Router Service
Stopped ALG
                           Application Layer Gateway Service
                           Application Identity
        AppIDSvc
Stopped
Running Appinfo
                           Application Information
        AppMgmt
                           Application Management
Stopped
Stopped AppReadiness
                           App Readiness
        AppVClient
                           Microsoft App-V Client
Stopped
Stopped AppXSvc
                           AppX Deployment Service (AppXSVC)
                           AssignedAccessManager Service
        AssignedAccessM...
Stopped
Running AudioEndpointBu... Windows Audio Endpoint Builder
Running Audiosry
                           Windows Audio
Stopped autotimesvo
                           Cellular Time
Stopped AxInstSV
                           ActiveX Installer (AxInstSV)
Stopped BcastDVRUserSer... GameDVR and Broadcast User Service ...
        BDESVC
                           BitLocker Drive Encryption Service
Running
Stopped BEService
                           BattlEye Service
Running BFE
                           Base Filtering Engine
Stopped BITS
                           Background Intelligent Transfer Ser...
Stopped BluetoothUserSe... Bluetooth User Support Service 197f...
Running BrokerInfrastru...
                           Background Tasks Infrastructure Ser...
Running BTAGService
                           Bluetooth Audio Gateway Service
Running BthAvctpSvc
                           AVCTP service
                           Bluetooth Support Service
Running bthserv
```

PS C:\Users\anthony> get-service | select | format-list : AarSvc 197f19e7 RequiredServices CanPauseAndContinue : False CanShutdown : False CanStop DisplayName : Agent Activation Runtime 197f19e7 Dependent Services MachineName Servicellane : AarSvc 197f19e7 ServicesDependedOn ServiceHandle Status Running : 240 ServiceType : Manual StartType Site Container : AdobeARMservice RequiredServices CanPauseAndContinue : False CanShutdown : False CanSton : True DisplayName : Adobe Acrobat Update Service DependentServices MachineName : AdobeARMservice ServiceName ServicesDependedOn : {} ServiceHandle Status : Running ServiceType : Win320wnProcess StartType Automatic Container : AESMService RequiredServices : {RPCSS CanPauseAndContinue : False CanShutdown : False : True CanStop DisplayName : Intel® SGX AESM DependentServices MachineName : AESMService Servicellane ServicesDependedOn : (RPCSS) ServiceHandle Status Running ServiceType : Win320wnProcess StartType : Automatic Container



- List <u>ONLY</u> services that have a <u>StartType</u> as automatic
 - Ensure the output <u>DOESN'T</u> get trimmed
- Use the below documentation
 - https://tinyurl.com/z5psdn87



- Run the following command
 - o Get-WmiObject win32_Service | select *
- What is the difference between this and Get-Service?









WMI & Services


Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

- Can be used to manage Windows devices
- Allows remote communications through:
 - Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)
 - Windows Remote Management (WINRM)
- Great tool for IT personnel and malicious actors



Services

- Behind the scenes to keep things working
- 4 startup types
 - Automatic (Delayed Start)
 - Automatic
 - Manual
 - Disabled






Services

- Canrun as nt authority \system
 - o nt authority \system!=root
 - Is more powerful than an "administrator"
- Active even when no user is signed in
- May be hosted by the service host (svchost.exe)
- May executables that are designated to be services
- Follow a defined service model




Service Model






How to list services?

Open Task Manager and navigate to services tab









Services (Local) Name Status Cryptographic Services Description Startup Type Log On As Client License Service (ClipS... Provides inf... Manual (Trig... Local System Stop the service Clipboard User Service_65f7e This user ser... Running Manual Local System Restart the service CNG Key Isolation The CNG ke... Manual (Trig... Running Local System COM+ Event System Supports Sy... Running Automatic Local Service Description: COM+ System Application Manual Local System Manages th... Running Provides three management services: Connected Devices Platfor... This service ... Automatic (... Local Service Catalog Database Service, which Connected Devices Platfor... This user ser... Running Automatic Local System confirms the signatures of Windows files and allows new programs to be Connected User Experience... The Connec... Disabled Local System installed: Protected Root Service. ConsentUX_65f7e Allows Con... Manual Local System which adds and removes Trusted Contact Data_65f7e Manual Local System Indexes con... Running Root Certification Authority CoreMessaging Manages co... Running Automatic Local Service certificates from this computer; and Automatic Root Certificate Update Credential Manager Provides se... Manual Local System Running Service, which retrieves root CredentialEnrollmentMana_ Credential E... Manual Local System certificates from Windows Update Cryptographic Services Provides thr... Running Automatic Network Service and enable scenarios such as SSL. If Data Sharing Service Provides da... Manual (Trig... Local System this service is stopped, these management services will not Ch Data Usage Network da... Running Automatic Local Service function properly. If this service is DCOM Server Process Laun... The DCOML... Running Local System Automatic disabled, any services that explicitly Delivery Optimization Performs co... Network Service Automatic (__ depend on it will fail to start. Device Association Service Enables pair... Manual (Trig... Local System Device Install Service Enables a c... Manual (Trig... Local System Device Management Enroll... Performs D ... Manual Local System

Routes Wire...

Enables the ...

Manual (Trig...

Manual (Trig...

Manual

Local System

Local System

Local System


Device Management Wirele...

DeviceAssociationBroker 65... Enables app...


Device Setup Manager

Extended / Standard /


















Services List





Services List





In Class Activity

Find a Malicious Service



Hands on 3- Find a Malicious Service

- Use the previous command we learned
 - Get-WmiObject win32_Service
 - Add | ogv at the end
- Attackers often want constant access
 - What <u>StartType</u> would an attacker use?
- If you see something say something
 - Google anything suspicious
 - Legitimate applications break often and people post online about them
- Remove the malicious service
 - O Hint[0]: sc delete <service name>
 - Hint[1]: Can services be processes?





Hands on 3- Delete a Malicious Service

- 1. <REDACTED>
- 2. Using Command Prompt, enter: <REDACTED>
- 3. Reboot



RESTART YOUR WINDOWS VIN



Persistence



Persistence

- Malware aims to survive
 - Restart
 - Settings Changes
 - Users signing on/off
 - Network connectivity loss
 - Countermeasures
 - Systems updates
 - Anything else....





Persistence Methods


- Windows persistence methods and their complexity
 - Drivers (HIGH)
 - Registry Keys (LOW)
 - Startup Objects (LOW)
 - Scheduled Tasks (LOW-MEDIUM)
 - Image File Execution Options (MEDIUM)
 - Hint: Might be relevant for your homework this week
 - WMI Subscriptions (MEDIUM)
 - PowerShell Profiles (LOW-MEDIUM)
 - Malicious Group Policies (MEDIUM)



Registry Keys




- Registry Editor is a GUI way of viewing registry
 - Get-ItemProperty can be used as well
 - https://tinyurl.com/9hbeh72f
- Two directories for running at sign on
 - HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft \Windows\CurrentVersion\Run





Scheduled Tasks

- Perform actions given specific triggers
- Stored in C:\Windows\System32\Tasks as xml files









Scheduled Tasks cont.

- Can be managed through Task Scheduler
- Consists of Triggers & Actions
 - Triggers: When Do?
 - o Actions: What Do?









PowerShell Profile

- Runs each time PowerShell.exe is opened
- A PowerShell script

Description	Path
All Users, All Hosts	\$PSHOME\Profile.ps1
All Users, Current Host	\$PSHOME\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
Current User, All Hosts	\$Home\[My]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
Current user, Current Host	\$Home\[My]Documents\PowerShell\ Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1



Malicious Group Policies

- Group policies can soften the security posture of a device
 - Disable anti-virus
 - Turn off or flood logs
 - Disable firewalls
 - o And more!
- Group Policies can be used to establish registry based persistence
- Malicious group policies are very dangerous




- Check services again
 - O What do you notice?



- SysInternals is an open-source suite of tools for Windows
 - AutoRuns a tool to detect persistence


Run autoruns as Admin from the Sysinternals

folder on your desktop






Categories of persistence









- Find and remove the item that is allowing the <REDACTED> to persist
 - Hint: It is not a GroupPolicy, PowerShell Profile, Driver, Image File Execution Option or Startup Object
- After you have removed the persistence
 - Stop the service using task manager
 - Delete the <REDACTED> using < REDACTED>
- Restart the computer
 - o Is the service gone?



Homework Links

- Persistence Image File Execution Options Injection
 - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/13/persistence-image-fileexecution-options-injection/
- Windows Security Log Event IDs
 - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encycl opedia/default.aspx
- Windows Sysinternals
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/



Additional Resources

- Abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (Black Hat)
 - https://tinyurl.com/a7jpzmsc
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SjMgnGwpq8
- Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection (Black hat)
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x97ejtv56xw
- PowerShell Documentation
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/



Questions?